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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ronnie Nicholas Radford timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation, thereby requiring him to serve the previously imposed sentence of five years,
with one and one-half years fixed, which he received upon his guilty plea to robbery.
On appeal, Mr. Radford argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process
of law when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of a probation violation
admission hearing. Additionally, Mr. Radford argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce his sentence upon revoking probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Lewis Johnson needed a transfer case to get his truck running.
Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI), p.3.)

(Presentence

Mr. Radford was pressured by

Mr. Johnson, his brother in law, to help Mr. Johnson break into an automotive business
and steal a transfer case.

(PSI, p.2-3.) After they entered the automotive business,

Mr. Johnson started stealing additionally property. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Radford was charged, by Information, with burglary.

(R., pp.13-14.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Radford pleaded guilty to burglary. (R., pp.15-16,
19.)

In return, the State agreed to recommend probation and not oppose a withheld

judgment. (R., pp.16, 19.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years,
with one and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Radford
on probation. (R., pp.27-28.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation and an
addendum to that report, wherein it was asserted that Mr. Radford failed to report to his
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probation officer, changed residence without prior approval from his probation officer,
and absconded from supervision. (R., pp.35-36, 45-46.) Mr. Radford admitted to the
allegations, and the district court found that he had violated the terms of his probation.
(R., p.41.) Thereafter, the district court continued Mr. Radford's probation. (R., pp.5051.)
After a period of probation, the State filed another report of probation violation,
wherein it asserted that Mr. Radford violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.6365.) Mr. Radford admitted to violating the terms of his probation by failing to complete
100 hours of community service, failing to earn his G.ED., leaving his assigned district
without permission, associating with drug users to purchase illegal drugs, and
consuming alcohol and prescription medications not prescribed to him. (R., pp.63-64,
69-70; 09/12/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-25.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court also
found that Mr. Radford violated the terms of his probation by failing to complete the
family drug court program and by failing to participate in the family drug court.
(R., pp.69-70;

09/12/11

Tr.,

p.22,

Ls.B-22.)

The district court then

Mr. Radford's probation and executed the underlying sentence.

revoked

(R., pp.73-74.)

Mr. Radford timely appealed. (R., pp.75-77.)
On appeal, Mr. Radford filed a motion to augment and suspend the briefing
schedule, requesting that the record on appeal be augmented with various transcripts.
(Motion to Augment, pp.1-6.) The State objected to Mr. Radford's Motion to Augment.
(Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.)
Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order, denying Mr. Radford's Motion to
Augment. (Order, p.1.)
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ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Radford due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Radford's
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Radford Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts
A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a court can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Radford filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various
transcripts and argued that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a district
court can consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing.

On appeal,

Mr. Radford is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the
transcripts. Mr. Radford asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the district
court's asserted failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking probation because that
decision was made after the original sentencing hearing, and the district court could
have, therefore, relied on its memory of the hearings in question when it decided to
revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme
Court erred in denying Mr. Radford's request.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Radford Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Radford With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His
Claims

The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art.
I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
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"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R.54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested
materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the state argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeaL" Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants the defendant's request to be denied, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing,
but the record contains court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful
review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has
9

"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to
provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489,
491 (Ct. App. 1999).

In this case, Mr. Radford presents as an issue on appeal the

question of whether the district court erred failing to sua sponte reduce his sentence
when it revoked his probation.

The transcript of the January 28, 2008, sentencing

hearing is necessary because trial counsel addressed the court in mitigation.
Additionally, a transcript of the September 8, 2008, probation violation admission
hearing is relevant because mitigation arguments were made in favor of Mr. Radford.
(R., p.42.) If Mr. Radford fails to provide the appellate court with the requested items,
the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Radford's claims will not be addressed on their
actual merits.

If it is state action alone which prevents his access to the requested

items, then such action is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such
presumption should no longer apply.
Additionally, transcripts of the December 18, 2007 entry of guilty plea hearing,
where Mr. Radford had a discussion with the district court, (R, p.19), the January 28,
2008 sentencing hearing, where Mr. Radford had another discussion with the Court,
and the October 27, 2008 probation violation disposition hearing, where Mr. Radford
made comments on his own behalf (R., p.50), are relevant and necessary to determine,
for instance, whether Mr. Radford either agreed to additional conditions of probation,
thus mooting a claim that his probation was revoked on conditions that were not
conditions of probation, or whether the court referenced any of its prior hearings in
ultimately revoking probation.

Therefore, they are relevant not only to the potential

merits of the issues but also to create a complete record on appeal.

See State v.

Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App., 2000) ("Burdett has failed to
10

include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the district
court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions of a
transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district court.").
Further, all of the requested transcripts are within an Idaho appellate court's
scope of review. The transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all
proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately
relinquished jurisdiction. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When
we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation.") (emphasis added).
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of
proceedings on appeal.

The decision to deny Mr. Radford's Motion to Augment will

render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts
support the district court's order revoking probation. This functions as a procedural bar
to the review of Mr. Radford's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Radford should either be provided with the requested transcripts, or the
presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Radford With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
11

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In doing so, the United State Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to
be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the denial of counsel
is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court
also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was so vital and
imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there
are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard.'"

Id. at 65 (quoting

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants with
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas
was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the
United State Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trialDwould be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United

States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
12

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of
any argument made or undercutting any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Radford has
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and cannot receive
the effective assistance of counsel that is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel
in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE,
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

These standards still offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of defense counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might affect the district court's decision
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to revoke probation. Further, appellate counsel is unable to advise Mr. Radford on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Radford is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Radford his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Radford's
Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Radford was egged on by his brother in law to steal a transfer case so his

brother in law could get his truck going. Mr. Radford begrudgingly went along with the
plan. It was during the robbery that Mr. Johnson decided to change the plan and steal
tools and stereos.

This is the version of the story accepted by the victim and indicates

that Mr. Radford is not a serious threat to society. When this is viewed in light of the
relevant mitigating factors it supports the conclusion that Mr. Radford's sentence is
unduly harsh.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Radford's
Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mr. Radford asserts that, given any view of the facts his unified sentence of five

years, with one and one half years fixed is excessive. Due to the district court's power
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under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the
revocation of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the
sentence as being excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003).
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Radford does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Radford must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria, or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The threat Mr. Radford poses to society is minimized because it was
Mr. Johnson who created the plan decided to steal the transfer case. (PSI, pp.2-3.) In
fact, the victim of the original offense said Mr. Radford "admitted to committing the crime
and assisted police with the investigation." (PSI, p.3.) The victim also said he felt that
Mr. Radford's decision to participate was influenced by his brother in law. (PSI, p.3.)
Therefore, Mr. Radford does not pose a significant threat to the community.
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Mr. Radford does recognize that his decision to use substances while on
probation poses a threat to the community.

However, Mr. Radford's substance

addiction is a mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). According to his
trial counsel:
[Mr. Radford] was placed on four years probation and [he] has
successfully completed about -- well, three years about eight months, nine
months, of that four year probation. Several months away from being
discharged from probation.
Mr. Radford is dealing with some issues, trying to cope with the
loss of [his father]. He turned to some things that were not positive ....
He was honest about that. He was seeking out some help with that.
(09/12/11 Tr., p.24, L.10 - p.25, L.12.) Mr. Radford started using alcohol when he was
nine years old. (Gain-I Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS),
p.2.)

While Mr. Radford has used other substances he was not diagnosed as

dependant on those substances.

(GRRS, p.2-3.)

Mr. Radford was diagnosed as

dependant on alcohol, but outpatient treatment was recommended. (Substance Abuse
Report, p.1.)

Therefore, Mr. Radford's substance addiction is most appropriately

considered in the context of mitigation.
Additionally, Mr. Radford's good character is a relevant mitigating factor.
Evidence of a defendant's good or bad character is relevant in a court's sentencing
decision. State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404,411 (1954). Mr. Radford married and took on
the responsibility of three step-children. (PSI, p.6.) One support letter indicated that
Mr. Radford is caring and a good role model. (PSI, p.6.)
Additionally, Mr. Radford has family support. In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that support of family and friends were
mitigating factors. The presentence investigator concluded that Mr. Radford does have
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family support. (PSI, p.1 0.) Mr. Radford reported that he had a perfect relationship with
his mother and his wife. (GRRS, p.10.)
Further, Mr. Radford displayed some mental health issues which should be
afforded some mitigating weight.

Even in instances where there is no nexus between a

crime and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence
mitigation. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008). Here, Mr. Radford reported
symptoms consistent with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and
ADHD. (GRRS, p.5.)
Finally, Mr. Radford has expressed remorse for his actions. In State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive
attributes of his character."

When asked to comment about the underlying offense,

Mr. Radford said he felt terrible and could not believe he was a participant. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Radford's remorse is consistent with his argument that he will not pose a future
threat to the community.
In sum, Mr. Radford was pressured by his brother in law and made a poor
decision to help him steal a transfer case. Even the victim agrees with Mr. Radford's
version of events. This supports Mr. Radford's claim that this was a one-time event and
he will not engage in this type of behavior in the future. When this is viewed in light of
the other mitigating factors, it supports the conclusion that Mr. Radford's sentence in
unduly harsh.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Radford

respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the indeterminate portion of his
sentence.
DATED this 2 nd day of May, 2012.

~

V--

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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